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The Advent of Neo-Revisionism?
✣
At a signal moment in the process of European uniªcation, when
ten new countries—most of them from Central and Eastern Europe—have
joined the European Union (EU), it is a propitious moment to look back and
ask when and how the unfortunate division of the European continent came
about. As Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Hungarians, and the peoples of
the Baltic states are entering “EU-Europe,” their decades of suffering under
the iron boot of Communism and painful loss of sovereignty under Soviet
Communism seem remote yet full of traumatic memories. In such moments
it behooves historians to take a look back and revisit the tragic months and
years of the early Cold War when the “Iron Curtain” came down and divided
Europe between East and West.
Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe reassess the origins and impact
of the Marshall Plan in June–July 1947 and conclude that the United States
(and to a lesser degree Great Britain and France) were responsible for the divi-
sion of the continent. They posit as their key thesis that “it was American pol-
icies as much as (and perhaps more than) Soviet actions that ªnally led to the
division of Europe.” In their view, U.S. ofªcials conceived of the European
Recovery Program (ERP) as a tool to exclude the Soviet Union from Euro-
pean reconstruction and to push Moscow toward “a breakdown” in Cold War
relations, thus forsaking all chances for continued cooperation. The momen-
tous decisions of late June and early July 1947, according to Cox and Ken-
nedy-Pipe, led to the exclusion of the East European states under Soviet tute-
lage from European reconstruction and thus drove them into the Soviet camp
for good. They maintain that Josif Stalin did not want a division of Europe
because he knew that, in economic terms, the Soviet Union could not win “an
extended and costly standoff” with the West. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe claim
that the antagonistic bloc system, as it developed in 1948 and beyond, was
the result of Western, not Soviet, intransigence during the initial rounds
of negotiations concerning the Marshall Plan. The USSR’s turn toward the
Cold War, they argue, “followed rather than preceded the breakdown of negoti-
ations in July 1947” (emphasis in original). When the United States and its
principal European allies made an effort “to pull the East Europeans away
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from the USSR” with the U.S. aid offer, they should have understood that
this would aggravate Soviet security concerns and thus make the situation
worse. When Stalin recognized that Washington was seeking to “roll back
Communism,” he would have nothing of it. A more ºexible and accommo-
dating Western approach during the crucial Paris conference, according to
Cox and Kennedy-Pipe, might have forestalled the division of Europe into
two hostile blocs.1
What are we to make of this new revisionist attempt to place the blame
for the post–World War II division of Europe squarely on the Americans and
their chief allies, Great Britain and France? From my perspective, as a histo-
rian of the Cold War in Central Europe, Cox’s and Kennedy-Pipe’s arguments
are less than persuasive. First, they entirely ignore the German question. Sec-
ond, they do not present any new evidence from Soviet archives indicating
that Stalin was willing to cooperate with the West. Third, they ignore dis-
agreements among U.S. policy elites over European reconstruction and the
German question and the complex framework of decision-making in Wash-
ington. Fourth, from the perspective of Cold War historiography, their article
does not advance our understanding of the genesis of the Cold War division
of Europe. Instead, it seems like a throwback to the arch-revisionism of the
1960s and early 1970s. Let me deal with each of these issues in turn.
The German Question
The struggle over the future of Germany and its role in European reconstruc-
tion was the key issue fueling and deªning the East-West antagonism on the
continent, as Marc Trachtenberg has recently reminded us.2 A German settle-
ment held the key to a lasting security regime in Europe. In July 1945 the
Allied agreement at Potsdam was designed to deliver German economic unity.
But economic unity was undermined by a system of reparations “swaps” be-
tween the zones, as the British reparations expert David Waley warned at
Potsdam: “[I]f a line is drawn across the middle of Europe, so that there is a
frontier with Russia on one side and the Western Powers on the other, this
has importance far transcending reparations.”3 In other words, long before
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the Marshall Plan was conceived, the reparations line drawn at Potsdam was
already a ªrst step toward the future partition of Germany, with vast implica-
tions for Europe.
By 1947 the Potsdam agreement had outlived its usefulness for the West-
ern occupation powers in Germany. As early as May 1946, General Lucius D.
Clay, the American deputy military governor for Germany, had stopped repa-
rations deliveries to the Soviet zone. The acrimonious negotiations in the
Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) deliberations in Paris frustrated Western
representatives. In September 1946, amid growing East-West tensions and a
lack of progress under the strict zonal regime in Germany, U.S. Secretary of
State James F. Byrnes announced the merging of the American and British
zones in his famous Stuttgart speech. Most historians now agree that this
decision, perhaps more than any other, precipitated the future partition of
Germany.4 The goal was to ease the burden of making the Western zones eco-
nomically viable.
In January 1947 the American and British zones began to operate as
“Bizonia,” which turned out to be a further step toward partition. The Anglo-
American Bizone was supposed to “assist materially in reviving industry and
foreign trade in both zones.”5 A “Joint Export-Import Agency” was set up to
help overcome obstacles of foreign trade. Over the next two years more
and more responsibility was turned over to the West Germans. During the
interminable seven-week CFM talks in Moscow in March and April 1947,
no agreement was reached on German reparations, levels of industry, and the
future of the Ruhr area, Germany’s industrial heartland.
Deadlock at the Moscow CFM meeting—combined with President
Harry S. Truman’s enunciation of his containment doctrine—was the crucial
turning point for American policy toward Germany and Europe. The new
U.S. secretary of state, George C. Marshall, returned from Moscow highly
frustrated with Soviet obstructionism on the German and Austrian questions,
just as Byrnes had been at the Paris meetings a few months earlier. Marshall
felt that Stalin was deliberately refusing to make concessions in the expecta-
tion that the West European economies would disintegrate. Time was of the
essence insofar as European recovery had been much slower than expected.
Marshall warned the American public in a radio address after his return to
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Washington: “The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate.”6 Action
was needed to revive the German economy and gear it for the reconstruction
of Western Europe. The breakdown of any agreement on Germany drove
Washington toward a European Recovery Program that included the Western
occupation zones of Germany. The revival of German economic strength and
of higher production levels without a reparations settlement was intolerable
for Stalin.
Agreement seems to be building among historians that Stalin wanted co-
operation in Germany, at least until the beginning of 1947, and that Ameri-
can intransigence in the economic arena as well as unilateral actions by the
British and Americans in preparing for a West German state ultimately pre-
cipitated the division of Germany.7 The train toward the partition of Ger-
many was gathering speed in 1947, long before the crucial weeks of Marshall’s
speech at Harvard and the European response. Growing disagreement over
Germany widened the cracks across the East-West divide on the continent. It
seems odd that Cox and Kennedy-Pipe fail to discuss how the German ques-
tion not only shaped the context in which decisions about the ERP were
made, but also spurred the formation of separate East-West blocs.
Lack of New Sources
Our two British historians wax eloquent about the new insights that the
opening of archives in the former Communist countries has yielded on the
genesis of the Cold War in general and the Marshall Plan in particular. Yet
they fail to present any new evidence that might prove their main thesis,
namely that Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov were in a cooperative and conces-
sionary frame of mind during the Paris conference in late June 1947. In a re-
cent study of the German Control Council, Günther Mai insists that until the
beginning of 1947 Stalin was prepared to make concessions in Germany to
prevent it from slipping into the American sphere of inºuence.8 Molotov’s in-
transigent stance at the Moscow CFM, however, seems to indicate that this
propitiatory mood had evaporated by the spring of 1947. During the critical
weeks of May and June, when State Department ofªcials were conceptualiz-
ing the ERP, Stalin embarked on a truculent course in Hungary by tightening
Communist control, getting rid of the Smallholders Party in the governing
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coalition, and forcing Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy into exile. Did the Com-
munist takeover in Hungary via “salami tactics” (as the Hungarian Commu-
nist leader Mátyás Rákosi put it) indicate Soviet accommodation? Did it sug-
gest that Stalin might be prepared to tolerate greater Western inºuence in
Eastern Europe if it came with economic aid? At a press conference on the
morning of 5 June, the day of Marshall’s speech, President Truman de-
nounced the situation in Hungary as “outrageous” and drew more press cover-
age than Marshall’s speech did.9
Despite the selective opening of archives in Moscow, the large majority of
Stalin’s personal papers concerning foreign policy, military affairs, and intelli-
gence are still classiªed. Unless we can eventually gain access to diaries, letters,
or memoranda that prove Stalin’s cooperative determination to tear down the
Iron Curtain he himself had erected in Europe, we will have to make infer-
ences from Molotov’s ambiguous behavior during the Paris meeting and Sta-
lin’s refusal to allow the East European countries to participate in the Marshall
Plan. At an early stage, Pravda ªred a broadside against Marshall’s scheme of
American “dollar imperialism,” sounding the principal theme of the vicious
post-Paris propaganda war against the Marshall Plan.10 By the time a highly
suspicious Molotov came to Paris, the Soviet ambassador in Washington,
Nikolai Novikov, had persuaded him that the Americans wanted to build a
“Western bloc.”11 When Stalin prohibited the Czechoslovak government
from participating in further European negotiations on the Marshall Plan, he
raised the same argument, namely that “under the cover of credit assistance to
Europe they were organizing something like a Western bloc against the Soviet
Union.”12 The Soviet propaganda line of the “West-bloc” guided the New
Left revisionist historians in the 1960s in their interpretation of the Marshall
Plan, blaming the Americans exclusively for the division of Europe. Re-
hashing this charge today does not make it any more persuasive.
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In Paris it was Molotov who tried to subvert the new American approach
of an integrated multinational European reconstruction program that would
take due account of European needs. Molotov insisted on a national approach
à la the wartime Lend-Lease program of bilateral aid to individual countries,
and he rejected the notion of having any “strings attached.” British Foreign
Minister Ernest Bevin, a hardline Cold Warrior who more than anyone
wanted a European reconstruction program without Soviet participation,
reminded Molotov early on in Paris that debtors usually did not ªx terms
for creditors and that Moscow could not simply ignore the requirement to
divulge its available resources and economic statistics.13
Molotov’s negotiating behavior in Paris betrayed the same truculence that
had won him the well-earned sobriquet of “Mr. Nyet” during the innumera-
ble CFM sessions.14 Initially moderate in Paris, Molotov quickly lived up to
Western expectations and turned down the U.S. invitation for the Soviet
Union to take part in the Plan. By implication, he also turned down the invi-
tations for the East European countries. Moscow’s rejection of the proposal
made sense politically, for, as Vladimir Pechatnov and Earl Edmondson have
noted, Soviet leaders were aware that “in an open-door competition their
country was no match for the American economic juggernaut.”15 After
months of such truculent behavior as chief Soviet negotiator, how could any-
one think that the tiger had changed his stripes?
True, the Western powers wanted to shift the burden of rejecting Ameri-
can aid onto the Soviet government, knowing full well that it would be hard
to convince the U.S. Congress to approve a vast European aid program in-
volving the Soviet Union at a time when the Truman administration had vig-
orously embarked on its containment strategy. The ERP was intended to be a
departure from the piecemeal approach of doling out American aid. Cox and
Kennedy-Pipe leave out a key part of the story by failing to discuss the U.S.
domestic context.
U.S. ofªcials would have been happy if the East European countries had
been included in the ERP, but they did not believe there was much chance it
would happen. Contrary to what Cox and Kennedy-Pipe suggest, the United
States at this time had not yet embarked on a rhetoric of “liberating” Eastern
Europe (it never became a realistic policy, as the American response to the cri-
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ses in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956 showed16). The United
States pursued a “non-policy” toward Eastern Europe, as Geir Lundestad ar-
gued more than twenty-ªve years ago.17 The region was never an area of prin-
cipal American interest. It was agriculturally and economically backward, and
any attempt to include it in the ERP would have greatly complicated the
American aid program in 1947 (in much the same way that the admission of
East European countries into the EU today is making the European integra-
tion effort exceedingly difªcult). Franklin Roosevelt had surrendered the re-
gion to Stalin in the infamous “percentages agreement” of 1944, and Truman
was not willing to expend great effort trying to “save” the region from Soviet
domination. The emerging “spheres” were part and parcel of the emerging
Cold War in 1945, and by 1947 the United States and its principal Western
allies, Great Britain and France, were prepared to tolerate the tightening of
these spheres into “blocs.” The Soviet Union, too, as Moscow’s “salami tac-
tics” in Hungary in 1947 abundantly demonstrated, was actively moving in
that direction well before the Marshall Plan.
Complexities of U.S. Decision-Making
During the crucial years 1946–1947, elites in Washington often disagreed
profoundly about almost every aspect of German and European reconstruc-
tion. Scholars who ignore these disagreements are bound to miss the subtlety
of Marshall’s offer in June 1947. On the one side General Clay and the Ofªce
of Military Government in Berlin were heading toward the division of Ger-
many with the unilateral May 1946 reparations stop. On the other side the
brilliant economists Charles Kindleberger and Walt W. Rostow, heading the
State Department’s “Division of German and Austrian Economic Affairs,”
promoted “the creation of an all-European economic organization designed
to accelerate lagging reconstruction and to achieve greater long-run economic
unity in Europe.” But the political ofªcers of the “European Division” in the
State Department opposed such a plan. With their apocalyptic vision of the
“Soviet threat” they had already embarked on policies that would lead to the
partition of Germany and eventually the division of Europe. James
Riddleberger of the State Department’s “Central European Division,” who
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helped draft Byrnes’s Stuttgart speech, noted that Soviet leaders were allowing
a policy of drift in Germany to make their zone “a permanent bastion on the
Elbe.” Yet the economists made sure Byrnes was aware that stiºing the Ger-
man economy would mean handicapping “the recovery of Europe.”18
During the Moscow CFM, American advisers to Marshall clashed regu-
larly, as Kindleberger’s dense letters from Moscow to his colleagues at the
State Department show. John Foster Dulles was pro-French and went along
with Paris’s demand for the internationalization of the Ruhr. Clay and his
aides in the Ofªce of Military Government of the United States for Germany
(OMGUS) were pro-German and wanted no concessions to be made to the
Soviet Union on German reparations out of current production. Kindleberger
felt Clay was “violent and a little insubordinate.” He and the economic advis-
ers advocated European solutions. He preferred that “we adopt a policy of try-
ing to unify all of Europe.”19
These policy battles were carried into the intense discussions of May
1947 during the gestation period for Marshall’s speech. Will Clayton, the
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, returned from Europe at the
end of May shocked by the breakdown of basic economic activity and advo-
cated a rehabilitation program for Western Europe. George F. Kennan, the di-
rector of Marshall’s new Policy Planning Staff in the State Department,
pleaded for the United States “to play it straight” and make at least a token ef-
fort to extend it to all of Europe. From this staff work Marshall favored two
points above all, namely “emphasis on opening the program to all of Europe
and insistence that Europe take the initiative,” as his biographer Forrest Pogue
put it. In his 5 June speech at Harvard, he did not exclude any European na-
tion but insisted that “governments, political parties, or groups which seek to
perpetuate human misery in order to proªt therefrom” will not be included.
Everybody knew whom he meant. Even though Bevin and Bidault hoped
from the outset that the Soviet Union would decline, Marshall insisted when
queried that “aid was open to all countries west of Asia.”20 Kindleberger, a key
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Vordenker of the European Recovery Program, makes a persuasive case that
the Marshall Plan originated in the economic section of the State Depart-
ment. Yet even Kindleberger, who had vigorously pushed a Europe-wide pro-
gram since 1946 and along with others had managed to get it inserted into
Marshall’s speech, was in the end relieved when Molotov walked out of the
Paris meeting in a huff: “we envisaged that the Russian bear could choke the
program to death by embracing it.”21 Bevin and Bidault fully agreed and acted
accordingly. Rather than a negative conspiracy of “subversion” to pull Eastern
Europe out of the Soviet sphere, as Cox and Kennedy-Pipe maintain, the
American policymakers were developing a positive plan to rehabilitate West-
ern Europe with the Western zones of Germany included. They could live
with Eastern Europe languishing under the Soviet iron heel.
Historiographic Pitfalls
The Cox and Kennedy-Pipe article, as I have suggested above, is an exercise in
neo-revisionism. It returns to the revisionism of the 1960s and early 1970s
while ignoring much of the past thirty years of scholarship on the Marshall
Plan. The New Left revisionists attributed historical agency almost entirely to
U.S. policymakers and depicted the Soviet Union as merely reacting to the
“Molotov Plan” and the Cominform. David Horowitz (who was then a radi-
cal leftist) stressed the American “counteroffensive” of the Marshall Plan.
Lloyd Gardner identiªed Dean Acheson as the mastermind behind the Mar-
shall Plan who desired a bipolar world. The implication was that the U.S.
ofªcials in Paris all wanted to avoid any compromise so that they could force
Molotov to leave Paris and charge that “the American plan would subvert Eu-
rope’s national economies” (emphasis added). Thomas Paterson claimed that
the “obvious British and French coldness toward Soviet participation” and
Molotov’s fear of the “subordination of the agricultural East to the industrial
West” induced the Soviet foreign minister to retreat from Paris.22 The tradi-
tionalists argued that the Cold War stemmed in part from the efforts that the
Communist parties made to subvert Western Europe and seize power,
whereas the revisionists turned this argument on its head in averring that
the deliberately subversive design of the Marshall Plan threatened the Soviet
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Union’s sphere of inºuence in Eastern Europe and spurred Stalin to establish
the Cominform in order to ward off that threat. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe re-
hash this argument by depicting the Molotov Plan as a defensive reaction
against the Marshall Plan’s design to subvert Moscow’s position in Eastern Eu-
rope. In their account, U.S. action and Soviet reaction caused the Cold War
bloc system. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe seem merely to be pouring old wine into
old bottles.
Where are the advances of Marshall Plan scholarship made by Michael
Hogan, Alan Milward, and Barry Eichengreen in this scheme?23 Where is
Charles Maier’s complex model depicting the Marshall initiative as resting on
three arcs of intersecting crises in 1945–1947 (namely the collapse of the Brit-
ish imperial role in the world balance of power, the problems of French and
Italian domestic stability, and the demise of western Germany’s economy and
morale)?24 Portrayals of Stalin as merely having reacted defensively to events
after the war rather than aggressively attacking Western policies are at odds
with the reality of Soviet truculence and uncompromising action in Eastern
and Central Europe and elsewhere in the immediate postwar era, not to men-
tion Molotov’s intransigence in the international negotiating arena. Cold War
historians cannot entirely ignore Soviet agency in sparking the East-West
conºict. The various waves of “post-revisionism” of the 1980s and 1990s
did a relatively good job of insisting that both sides must share the blame
for the Cold War. By singling out John Lewis Gaddis’s post–Cold War Ameri-
can triumphalism in We Now Know, Cox and Kennedy-Pipe are creating
a straw man of “neo-traditionalism.” Too much sophisticated scholarship
has appeared about the origins of the Cold War and the formation of the bloc
system to merit a return to the simpliªcations of revisionism.
Against the backdrop of continued U.S.-European disagreements over
the Bush administration’s “preemptive” war in Iraq, it is not altogether sur-
prising that two European scholars would produce a jaundiced reassessment
of the origins of the post-1945 Euro-American cooperation that originated in
the Marshall Plan era. During the Vietnam War, American historians looked
at the roots of U.S. interventionism and discovered that aggressive American
behavior in the early Cold War was the taproot of all evil. In both instances
blame is being laid exclusively on America’s doorstep. One does not need to be
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a supporter of Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam policies or agree with George W.
Bush’s Iraq war to note that in both instances these historical reassessments are
blinkered. Nor is it triumphalist to end by citing the recent assessment by
Thomas McCormick, one of the leading lights of 1960s Wisconsin revision-
ism: “The Marshall Plan was arguably the most innovative piece of foreign
policy in American history.”25
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